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Abstract
The Australian wheat industry has changed considerably in structure and governance during
the past 15 years.  The most important changes have been the deregulation of the domestic
market and privatisation of the former Australian Wheat Board into AWB Limited. Through
these changes growers have become shareholders in the various companies. Governance of the
monopsonistic relationship between AWB Limited and AWB International by the Federal
Minister of Agriculture and the Grains Council of Australia through the Wheat Export
Authority has proved ineffective.  Hence a national organisation that represents shareholders is
recommended to increase grower governance of the supply chain and marketing of wheat.
Key Words: Grain, Marketing, Infrastructure, Competition and Governance.
The presentation of this paper was sponsored by Grain Growers Association.  The views
presented in this paper are strictly those of the author and may not coincide with the views or
opinions of Grain Growers Association or its members.
Contributed paper presented to the 48
th Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics
Society Conference, Melbourne, February 11-13, 2004.
I would like to thank Alistair Watson for useful information and comments.
α Terence Farrell, 11 Cynthia Crescent, Armidale, NSW 2350.  Phone  02 6771 2093.  Email:
farrelltc@bigpond.com1
Table of Contents












       Page
Table 1.  Selected Changes in the Bulk Handling Industry 1989-2003.……………4
Table 2. Bulk Rail Company Ownership Between 1996 and 2003…………………6
Table 3. Industry Relationships after Deregulation of the Wheat Industry………...102
Introduction
The Australian Grains Industry has changed during the past 15 years from a collaborative quasi
government structure to a fragmented competitive capitalistic structure.  The assets of the
former State Grains Boards (SGB’s) and the Australian Wheat Board were distributed to
growers through various commercialization programs with the aim of providing growers with
control over their industry.  However the oversight structure of the new grain handling
organizations, like many other corporate entities, does not provide growers with “control” of
their industry unless they have control over the boards that make decisions on the behalf of
shareholders.
An obvious question that needs to be addressed is whether growers need control of their
industry organisations and for what purpose.  The argument presented in this paper is that
growers require control to regulate the activities of the rail operators and bulk handlers
particularly AWB Limited due to the fact that it acts as a monopsonist in the provision of
services to the export grains industry.  AWB International holds monopsony rights as a
function of the Wheat Marketing Act of 1989.  By the term monopsonist, I refer to the power
of an organisation to charge costs at a high rate than the level at which marginal cost equals
average variable costs.  This paper does not examine the issue of an exporter’s power to act as
an oligopolist in foreign markets - see Chang and Martel (2003) and Lobb and Fraser (2003).
The major flaw in the structural development of the new grains industry was that AWB
Limited was allowed to compete in the domestic market with the former State Grains Boards
and other agribusiness companies.  These events should not have been permitted until AWB
International had rescinded control of the single desk due to potential conflicts of interest
(Watson, 1999).  Under the current circumstances grower control is necessary to ensure that
the cost of AWB Limited service provision to AWB International is based on a competitive
price rather than a monopsonistic price.
Growers also require control to ensure that their other grain handling assets are not
disadvantaged by the operations of AWB Limited in the domestic market.  Purcell and Beard
(1998) show how domestic market traders can be disadvantaged by the operations of a single
exported that also operates in the domestic market. In some states growers own shares in
competing grain handling organizations.  Many growers in NSW, Victoria and Queensland, for
instance, would own shares in both GrainCorp and AWB Limited.
The political groups that once represented growers in grain industry disputes have been
suffering from declining support due to a lack of relevance at the state level and the rising level
of industry segmentation.  The State Farm Organisations (SFO’s) including Agforce, NSW
Farmers, Victorian Farmers Federation, South Australian Farmers Federation and Western
Australian Farmers Federation have had disputes among themselves regarding the policy
direction of their peak body the Grains Council of Australia (GCA).  In particular a number of
states had threatened to withdraw their membership to the GCA due to the cost of membership.
The GCA appears to have formed an alliance with AWB Limited in an effort to differentiate
what GCA does from other grower organisations. The GCA has openly opposed other grower
organisations such as Grain Growers Association (QLD, NSW & VIC), United Grower
Holdings (SA) and Pastorists and Graziers Association (WA) in matters such as the review of3
the Wheat Export Authority.  The division between the State Farm Organisations has added to
the level of instability in the current industry structure.
The ability of the State Farm Organisations to lobby and make an impact on industry regulation
through the various Governments has been waning.  The value of lobbying a State or Federal
Government Member on a grains related issue has declined due to the fact that governments no
longer own or manage the industry or the supply chain assets.
Growers require a representative organisation that is national and has the power to influence
the management of the grain handling organisations, rail companies and port handling
companies.  The organisation will need to take account of growers’ joint ownership of AWB
Limited as well as their interests in other grain handlers.
In this paper, issues of industry structure are debated with particular emphasis on an alternative
structure that allows for increased grower control of the various new grain handling and rail
entities.
Background
Prior to 1989 wheat growers in Australia supplied grain to marketing boards that operated in
each of the major grain producing states and those State Boards then accumulated and supplied
grain to the Australian Wheat Board for export.  The supply of grain to marketing boards was
mandatory and is still regulated for a majority of grains in Western Australia and barley in
Victoria and South Australia.  The relationship between the state grain accumulators and the
national wheat exporter was collaborative. Collaborative arrangements also existed between
the grain accumulators and rail operators. Rail transport was primarily State Government
owned and operated. Shipping ports were operated by various State Authorities.  The costs to
growers for the delivery of grain was averaged by state and the costs were deducted from the
total revenue that growers received at port (FOB).  Essentially the Federal and State
Governments owned the assets and bureaucrats oversaw the management of the assets.  See
Brennan (1995) for a review of the farm to port issues.
The industry prior to 1989 projected a positive and functioning image to growers. Growers saw
harmony between the service providers as each had a specified role to play in the accumulation
and delivery of grain to export markets.  Supply chain competition was regulated. Management
of the bulk handlers was focused on the task of moving grain at a minimal cost rather than
competition between the sectors.  Ministers were responsible for the efficient running of the
quasi government organisations in their portfolios; hence, they were the first point of call for
lobbyists as the ministers had power to affect the system. At that time the various state and
Federal Ministers were influential in providing benefits to growers.
The Path to Deregulation.
The 1986 Royal Commission into Grain Handling led to deregulation of the domestic grains
industry in 1989. Wait and Ahmadi-Esfahani (1996) place more context around the
deregulation event. Essentially the domestic grains industry was described by the Commission
as being inefficient and the system retarded growth of the milling and baking industries as well
as the chicken, beef and pork industries.4
After deregulation in 1989 the most interesting changes were those to the former State Grains
Boards.  The Boards first changed to a cooperative structure with the various State
Governments transferring ownership to growers.  The next step was to move from a
cooperative to a private structure, as this would allow growers to trade shares outside of the
cooperative. Finally the privatized company would be listed on the Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX).  AWB Limited followed the same development path that had occurred with the State
Grains Boards when it progressed from being government owned to publicly listed company.
The major exception to the privatisation rule was Cooperative Bulk Handlers (CBH) in
Western Australia.  Growers in that state had the opportunity to privatise CBH in 2000;
however, they voted to retain their cooperative structure.   CBH had also proposed a deal with
AWB International to manage the accumulation and transportation of grain in Western
Australia.  To date this deal has not been pursued by AWB.  Table 1 shows a selection of the
major changes that occurred in the bulk handling industry in the period after deregulation.
The grains industry is characterised as an “economies of scale” business. The need for
increasing economies of scale has led to a number of amalgamations between industry
participants. The former State Grains Boards on the east coast, namely Grainco (QLD),
GrainCorp (NSW) and Vicgrain (Vic), have all been incorporated into one company –
GrainCorp. GrainCorp competes with Netco, which is a cooperative company operating in all
grain producing states.   AWB Limited has been aggressive in competing with GrainCorp by
establishing super-sites in the prime grain accumulation areas of NSW and Victoria and has
recently expanded into Queensland to compete with GrainCorp’s takeover of Grainco in 2003.
AWB Limited justifies its expansion into the domestic grain accumulation market by claiming
that the east coast is a combination of virtual state based monopolies.  GrainCorp would claim
that the size of the domestic market does not facilitate a large number of cost effective grain
handlers. To some extent the domestic industry primarily serves the milling and baking
industry.  Those in the domestic feed business have been contracting with growers directly for
the supply of grain.  Some cattle feeders have contracts that include a payment to the growers
for on farm storage and transport. These developments have led to a reduction in the
opportunities for new entrants to the domestic grain handling business.
AWB Limited has also been proactive by acquiring business such as Landmark Limited. AWB
Limited was involved in a hostile takeover of Elders in June of 2003.  Elders is a direct
competitor to Landmark. AWB Limited had also completed due diligence on Grainco prior to
its merger with GrainCorp.  These actions suggest that AWB Limited has surplus funds to
invest and that it views investment in the Australian domestic market as being more beneficial
than developing business alliances or infrastructure in overseas grain markets.  O’Donnell,
Griffith, Nightingale and Piggott 2003 still find evidence that grain buyers of domestic wheat
and barley exhibit oligopsonistic behaviour.  This may explain AWB’s desire to expand into
the domestic market.
Wilson (1995) has suggested that vertical control, “either through contracting or integration is
essential for exploiting the demand for (grain quality) heterogenity’ (p23).  However, as the
number of international grain importing agencies diminishes the ability of a single seller to
meet more specialised demand at a competitive price may become more difficult.5
Table 1. Selected Changes in the Bulk Handling Industry 1989-2003.
Company Event Year
ABB Grain Ltd Listed as a public company.
Developed from Barley Marketing Acts in SA (1947) and Vic




New company formed from merger between Grainco Australia Ltd
and Aus-Bulk Ltd. Source: ABA 2004.
1999
Aus-Bulk Limited Acquired Joe White Malting
Acquired Adelaide Malting Company
Unlisted public company owned by United Grower Holdings 50%





AWB Limited Bought Agribusiness Landmark Limited from Wesfarmers
Moved into the domestic grain handling business
Publicly listed on the Australian Stock Exchange
{AWB Limited is owned by B class shareholders which include a
proportion of growers who may also be A class shareholders.
A class shareholders appoint growers to the board of AWB
International which is subservient to the AWB Limited board.}
Australian Wheat Board (Est. 1939) was privatized into AWB
International which is a subsidiary of AWB Limited.








Merged with Grain Pool of Western Australia (Est. 1922).  2000
WA Growers voted to retain cooperative ownership rather than







Publicly listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
NSW Grains Corporation was renamed GrainCorp Operations and
privatised.
Prime Wheat Association (later Grain Growers Association)
acquired NSW Grain Corporation from the NSW Government.
Grain Handling Authority was corporatised and renamed NSW
Grain Corporation.









Netco Umbrella organisation for seven grain handling cooperatives from
each of the grain producing states.  Have retained their cooperative
structure.
2002
Vicgrain Victorian Grain Services was renamed Vicgrain6
Railway Companies
The rail system in Australia is a mix of rail gauges with broad gauge in Victoria, narrow gauge
in QLD, South Australia and Western Australia and standard gauge in NSW. Some states such
as South Australia are networked with standard gauge lines or in the case of Victoria it has dual
gauge on some routes. These are typically the city-to-city freight routes in the eastern states.
There are very few lines that link grain producing regions to one another; thus the domestic
industry is very reliant on road transport for that task.  The lack of a standard rail gauge
network in Australia limits the competition for the freight task as locomotives and wagons
cannot be readily accessed from other states when freight requirements are high.  This leads to
the need for rail companies to over invest in wagons, which then adds to their freight costs.
The most expensive freight tasks are those in NSW where trains are required to traverse the
Great Dividing Range.  In addition to this, the state of the infrastructure in NSW and Victoria
is very poor and adds to the freight costs because of the slow train turnaround time. See
Brennan (1995) and Eley (1998) for more on the costs of rail freight operations.
The Australian rail industry was also deregulated during the past ten years.  The pace of
investment and privatization has been similar to the grains industry. See Table 2 to see the
change in rail ownership since 1996.  John Anderson (1996) has said, “ I am frequently advised
that competing government-owned rail operators do not have a sufficient profit motive and
choose to distort the market through non-commercial behaviour.”
In NSW Pacific National, Silverton Rail and Freight Australia now bid on freight tenders from
AWB International to the port zones of Geelong, Port Kembla and Newcastle.  The track has
remained the property of the Rail Infrastructure Corporation (NSW Government).  A deal
between the NSW Government and the Federal Government will most likely see the transfer of
the NSW network with exceptions of the Hunter Valley and city network to Australian Rail
Track Corporation.  In the 2001 sale of FreightCorp the rolling stock and locomotives were
sold to Pacific National.  Pacific National now has obligations to provide rail transport on
branch lines in NSW to 2006. After that time the existence of rail branch lines services in grain
regions will be in doubt.
The rail system in Victoria is also under threat with Freight Australia closing non-profitable
lines. Freight Australia purchased a lease on the track as well as the rolling stock in that state.
Freight Australia has trains working on the standard gauge track in NSW and competes with
Pacific National.
The Australian National network in South Australia was bought by Genesee and Wyoming in
1997.  That group then joined with Wesfarmers to produce a company called Australian Rail
Group.  The Australian Rail Group (ARG) then purchased WestRail in 2000. ARG has
invested in rail infrastructure on the narrow gauge network in Western Australia to carry 100
tonne wagons. The terrain is relatively flat and the haul is typically short (<320 km) which
means the freight task is relatively inexpensive compared to the eastern states (Eley, 1998, p3).
CBH also has superior loading and unloading infrastructure compared to other states that
reduce rail costs.
Q-Rail also provides a competitive service in which it diverts trains from the coal industry
during a part of the year for the relatively small wheat export task in that state.7




Created by Inter-governmental Agreement to act as a
single point of access to the interstate standard gauge
network.
1996
Australian National Sold to Genesee and Wyoming Group in 1997.  The
new company was called Australian Southern
Railway.
1997
WestRail Sold to the Australian Rail Group (ARG), which is a
50/50 joint venture between Australian Southern
Railway (Genesee & Wyoming Group) and
Wesfarmers.
ARG was also in the Alice Springs to Darwin
Railway consortium called Asia Pacific Transport,
which commenced operations last month.
2000
FreightCorp (NSW) Sold to Pacific National Limited. 2000
V-Line Freight Corp. Sold to Freight Australia. 2002
Q-Rail Remained the property of the Queensland
Government.  Q-Rail created a subsidiary company to
compete on standard gauge lines in Northern NSW.
2003
AWB International negotiates freight charges with rail companies in each state.  AWB
International then sets a freight rate for each silo, elevator or super-site including those of
AWB Limited and its competitor GrainCorp. GrainCorp claims that AWB’s rate setting policy
stifles investment in grain loading and unloading infrastructure.  AWB international
alternatively argues that the size of the freight task provides them with volume discounts that
other bulk handlers could not match.  GrainCorp bought a train in 2002 to move grain for the
domestic market and this has provided it with an estimate of competitive rate structures on
various routes.  In the future it can be expected that more contractors will operate their own
trains and perhaps contract to AWB International on a hook and pull basis.
The increased use of trucks has put additional pressure on the future of branch lines as the
reduced line volume leads to higher costs per tonne which then benefits the increased use of
trucks.  AWB Limited’s entry into the domestic market has added to regional road costs as the
larger trucks are being more frequently used to haul grain longer distances from farm to the
grain accumulation centers. A regional development planning process for the super sites would
have made the development process more tolerable to local communities. The local
communities could have then also benefited by imposing a regional road tax. With the new
system rural communities are likely to lose their roads as well as the rail lines.8
Ports
Ports in Australia have also been privatized in the past ten years.  The management of ports is
regulated in a number of states to ensure access.  An essential feature of a cost competitive
modern bulk handling port is the ability to handle large vessels. This requires deepwater access
and storage or rapid train unloading facilities.  Many port in Australia have the ability to load
quickly; however few have deepwater access.  Rail access to city ports such as Melbourne,
Sydney and Brisbane is being hampered by the container trade and congestion on the urban
networks.  Melbourne and Brisbane may follow Sydney’s example and restrict these city ports
to container traffic only.
GrainCorp entered into a partnership with Grainco in 1999 to establish a company called Bulk
Terminals Australia.  Bulk Terminals Australia owns and operates the ports in Brisbane
(Fisherman’s Island) and Newcastle. Port Kembla in NSW is 100 per cent owned by
GrainCorp. The Fisherman’s Island port is state of the art; however it suffers from poor rail
access.  Trains can be held up for hours while they negotiate the Brisbane metro network.
Over time a new rail connection to a deepwater port such as Gladstone will need to be
developed for QLD grain exports.
GrainCorp Operations also owns the grain handling ports at Geelong and Portland in Victoria.
These two ports have 730,000 and 187,200 tonnes of storage capacity and typically load
vessels up to 60,000 tonnes.
The ownership of these ports by GrainCorp provides an area of concern to AWB International
due to a lack of port options. A new port facility of 45,000 tonnes has been built at the
Appleton Dock in the Port of Melbourne by AWB Limited and Australian Bulk Alliance.
Australian Bulk Alliance is a partnership between Aus-Bulk and Grainco (Essential Services
Commission, 2004). GrainCorp bought Grainco in 2003.  Under the merger agreement the half
share of Australian Bulk Alliance (ABA) held by Grainco has to be divested by GrainCorp to
satisfy competition requirements.
The introduction of competition between AWB Limited and GrainCorp has meant that port
infrastructure ownership on the east coast is now also a contentious issue.  The Essential
Services Commission of Victoria has established a “negotiate-arbitrate” access regime where
“GrainCorp must provide access to its export grain handling and storage facility on ‘fair and
reasonable terms’” (Essential Services Commission, 2004).  However AWB and Aus-Bulk do
not fall under the Grain Handling and Storage Act for their new facility.  One might expect
AWB Limited to build more port facilities in an effort to avoid using GrainCorp facilities.
The South Australian Government sold seven ports to Flinders Ports in 2001 (Wilson, 2003).
Aus-Bulk operates the port Ardrossan.  The Essential Services Commission of South Australia
is reviewing the regulations for charges at six of the seven ports (Wilson). There is a growing
trend in South Australia to use Port Lincoln in preference to other ports as it can handle large
ships. In some cases ships are bottom filled at a shallow water port and then filled at a deep-
water port.  Aus-Bulk is also in the process of developing a deep-sea port at Outer Harbour.
That port will handle vessels up to 80,000 tonnes.9
The port facilities in Western Australia are primarily managed by CBH and as yet AWB
Limited has not established competing services in that market.
The above review of the ownership structure of grain accumulation companies, rail companies
and port companies shows that the Federal Government did not fully comprehend the potential
impact of AWB Limited’s move into the domestic market. There is no doubt that competition
was required in the bulk handling, rail and ports sectors.  More competition may still be
required.  However, the fact that AWB International has control of the freight task from bulk
handlers to port will more than likely pull business away from AWB Limited’s competitors
into its own newly established subsidiary companies. This is the reason why AWB Limited’s
opponents promote the concept of AWB International acting as a marketer of wheat that allows
competing companies to bid on the various freight management tasks.  AWB Limited would
claim that this is just a ploy of its competitors to retain business.
Industry Governance
Wheat exports in Australia are regulated by the Wheat Marketing Act of 1989.  See Watson
(1999) for a concise review or Irving, Arney and Linder (2000). Potential exporters of bulk
wheat shipments, other than AWB International, must apply to the Wheat Export Authority for
a permit to export.  However AWB International must also approve the application before it is
granted.  Export wheat shipments in containers need only be approved by the Wheat Export
Authority.  The Wheat Marketing Act makes provision for AWB International to set the grade
standards for export pools.  AWB International makes use of this clause to impose a
requirement for “ticket by ticket” delivery to pools.  This business rule effectively blocks
competitors to AWB International from delivering grain to port.  AWB International is
therefore able to collect the blending gains from mixing grain of various grades and regions.
The ticket-by-ticket business rule also enables AWB International to be the only organisation
to negotiate freight rates with rail companies in each state for export wheat. The Joint Industry
Submission Group (2000) argues that opening up the service of delivery to port to competitors
would provide a benefit of approximately $5.00 per tonne to growers.  The Accenture Report
(2002) argues that the savings would be in the range of $5 -15 per tonne.  The rule as it
currently stands restricts investment by AWB Limited’s competitors in grain handling and rail
infrastructure for export related services.
The Wheat Export Authority (WEA) is required to provide two reports on the operation of the
single desk by AWB International.  The first is the report to the Federal Minister of Agriculture
and the second is the Grower Report, which is provided to the Grains Council of Australia. The
report to the Minister contains confidential information whereas the Grower Report does not.
The WEA has made a number of recommendations during the past three years to improve the
assessment process.  It was argued during the 2003 Senate Enquiry into further funding for the
WEA that the Authority was a toothless tiger as it could not request the necessary information
that it required from AWB International to perform its task and secondly that it failed to
implement its own recommendations. The Senate review of the WEA in 2003 has mandated
that the WEA receive its operating funds from growers via a levy on export wheat sales.  The
2003 Senate Enquiry also mandated a review of the operations of AWB International in terms
of its performance in relation to exports and the benefits that AWB International provides to
growers.10
An on-going concern to the WEA is the formula that AWB International uses to pay AWB
Limited for the provision of services to the pool (WEA, 2003).  The formula includes a fixed
fee plus a capped out-performance bonus.  The out-performance bonus is based on an index of
performance by similar organisation in the marketplace plus some market based assessment
(hurdles) to which only the WEA has access.  The main concern with the fees is that the fixed
component is too high in a drought year.  The second concern is that the market-based hurdles
are not high enough to justify bonus payments.
Other organisations also have issues with AWB’s structure.  The grower representative
organisation Grain Growers Association has issues with AWB Finance, which is also a
subsidiary of AWB Limited.  AWB International is responsible for paying growers in either
three or four installments over the life of the pool, which is typically 18 months.  AWB
Finance raises revenue from a range of finance products including harvest loans provided to
growers against the value of the estimated pool return.  AWB International thus has the ability
to increase interest revenue to AWB Finance by delaying payments to growers thus extending
the term of the loan.  It is difficult for AWB International to justify late payments within the
existing business structure of AWB Limited without it being accused of profiteering.  It has
been suggested that profits made by AWB Finance should be returned to the pools to offset
costs, as finance was and is a direct pool related function.  New competition from the banking
industry in Australia has reduced rates and loan costs; however, AWB Finance still retains a
large share of the business.
AWB Limited’s purchase of Landmark from Wesfarmers in August of 2003 also raised a
number of issues for grower organisations.  The main concern was why grain industry funds
were being used for purposes unrelated to the grains industry.  In particular many growers
could not understand why AWB did not invest its “surplus funds” in rail infrastructure to
reduce costs.
AWB Limited’s entry into the grain accumulation market has lead to many fractures in the
supply chain.  Information flow was one of the first casualties. Foreign and domestic marketing
information has dried up causing planning difficulties for market forecasters and plant
breeders.  The development of new grain accumulation centers has raised concerns by local
shires and councils over the damage to road infrastructure and the potential abandonment of
short line rail services. These issues and those described above have been aired in the rural
media causing growers to perceive their current industry as being one in chaos.
Many growers have become despondent due to the debate in the press and they hark back to
the old days of Government control over the industry.  AWB plays on that sentiment and
makes claims that any changes to the grain marketing system will lead to the end of the single
desk.  This tactic has been successful in raising emotions; however some opponents to the
current domestic structure, such as the PGA, now see the removal of the single desk from
AWB Limited as the only strategy left to regain control of the single desk.
Some growers blame the apparent disharmony in the industry on their State Farm
Organisations as they have formed alliances with state based bulk handlers or AWB
International.  It would be reasonable to also assume that AWB Limited would want to reduce
the effectiveness of the GCA by instigating disputes among the State Farm Organisations to
reduce the GCA’s ability to develop a unified policy on the single desk.11
Watson (1999) provides insight to the conflict between the GCA and its state affiliates.  The
conflict according to Watson “reflects conflicts of economic interest and ideology” where at
that time the economic interest was the accumulated assets of the Wheat Industry Fund and
their potential end use.
The transition of growers from mere participants in a government regulated marketing process
to the status of owner and shareholder of private grain handling companies has also changed
the grower’s incentives and loyalties.  Where previously growers might have been nonchalant
about the business of their local grain accumulator many now have a vested interest in
choosing the services of one company over another. They now receive annual reports
identifying the value of their newly acquired assets.  Some growers in the eastern states are
irate about two companies in which they now own shares competing with another.
When the Federal and State Governments were the owners of the grain handling and transport
infrastructure assets State Farm Organisations were pivotal in extracting benefits on behalf of
the grains industry as they were seen as the representatives of the most relevant stakeholders.
It must also be recognized that benefits are no longer extracted from taxpayers.  The new
source of benefits is the customer of the bulk handler.  If the customer and the shareholder are
the same entity then the costs and benefits are a simple circular transfer.  Financial leakages in
the system are to non-grower shareholders, taxpayers and management.
The concern that shareholders have toward the costs of management is ubiquitous.  The non-
grower shareholders would obviously seek to earn as much after tax income as possible.  But a
new leakage is Corporations tax, which is 30 per cent of gross profit.
Changes in the relationship structure since deregulation are shown in Table 3.  Note from
Table 3, that the number of sectors that have shifted from collaborative relationships to
competitive relationships.
Table 3. Industry Relationships after Deregulation of the Wheat Industry.
Sector Prior to Deregulation Now
AWB International  Collaborative Exporter Domestic Competitor
Bulk Handlers  Collaborative Competitive
Departments of Agriculture  Collaborative Competitive
Foreign Market Information  Collaborative Competitive
Grains Council  Strong Influence Oversight of Single desk
Grower Organisation  Local issues National issues
Growers  Beneficiaries Source of Benefits
Management  Bureaucratic fee scale Profit Benefit Fees
Minister for Agriculture  Influence Over Industry Oversight of Single desk
Plant Breeding  Collaborative Competitive
Ports  Collaborative Competitive
Rail Companies  Collaborative Competitive
Shareholders  N/A Financial Benefits
Taxpayers  Debtors (Loss) Creditors (Benefit)
University  Collaborative Competitive12
The Role of the Federal Minister for Agriculture
Agriculture Minister, Warren Truss, imposed a levy on the export wheat industry to fund the
WEA oversight activities in 2003.  The WEA only has the power to obtain information relating
to the operations of AWB International and assess benefits to growers from the single desk.
That information is then tabled in Parliament and provided in a report to growers.  The process
then stops.  There is no inbuilt action plan to carry out the recommendations of the WEA.  The
WEA must report to the GCA; however, the organisation appears to have formed an alliance
with AWB Limited. For instance the GCA have not pursued a public issue from the
recommendations published in the past three WEA grower reports.  When growers
organisations raise issues from the grower report they are made out to be self-interested agents
of the domestic grain handlers. Thus the reports lay idle and do not lead to progressive action.
The Federal Agricultural Minister displays strong support for the single desk, AWB
International and indirectly AWB Limited to the detriment of the other sectors of the domestic
industry.  An incentive that may be attributed to the Minister for this one sided approach could
be a fear of ballot reprisal for tinkering with the single desk.  The Minister may also have been
reluctant to make changes to the structure of AWB International prior to the negotiation of the
Free Trade Agreement with the United States. The management of AWB appear to have
realized that the Minister is reluctant to introduce changes to the single desk and appear to have
gained an upper hand in their domestic expansion program.  If the Minister has succumbed to
this form of political capture then a new mechanism needs to be put in place to regulate the
industry.
A second theory for why the Minister may be reluctant to minimize the profit making from
AWB Limited service activities could be that the Government has a vested interest in company
tax revenue.  As AWB Limited profits grow so does the tax revenue and indirectly the Minister
is will be in favour with the Treasurer for bringing in revenue. Alternatively the Government
also receives tax revenue from AWB Limited’s competitors so this line of reasoning does not
seem persuasive.
Grower Representation
The Grains Council of Australia was established in 1930.  The current State Farm
Organizations members of the council include AgForce (Qld), NSW Farmers Association
(NSWFA), South Australian Farmers Federation (SAFF), Victorian Farmers Association
(VFF) and Western Australian Farmers Federation (WAFF).  The Tasmanian Farmers
Federation is an associate member.
The GCA’s sphere of influence has diminished with each sale of the former statutory
marketing boards.  The State Farm Organizations have become less relevant with the
divestment of the state grain handler, the state railway, and the state port authority.  The
national divestment of the Wool Board, Australian Wheat Board, Australian Meat Board and
many other boards has added to the demise. The fact that the WEA must report to the GCA is
one of its last legitimate responsibilities.  Given that the GCA is the grower reference body for
the WEA it is not clear why the GCA would unquestionably support AWBs position on the
single desk.13
The position of the GCA was clearly highlighted via the 2003 Senate Enquiry into further
funding for the WEA.  In a press release the GCA chairman is quoted as saying, “the GCA sees
the Government’s and, in particular, the Minister’s support for the single wheat export desk
throughout this debate as extremely reassuring to the industry and it is very much appreciated.”
(Grains Council of Australia, 2003). This statement was released even though a large number
of the domestic wheat industry participants had openly criticized the performance of the WEA
and AWB.  It would seem reasonable that the minister would provide a balanced response
given the number of domestic constituents and that the GCA would be concerned over the
benefits of the single desk and the costs that growers have to pay via service fees to AWB
Limited to attain those benefits.
The State Farm Organisations and the GCA are faced with declining revenue from declining
membership. State affiliates pay a fee to the GCA for membership.  As the number of members
to state organisations decline so does their ability to support the GCA financially.  The lack of
funding has reduced research and political activity that has led to a negative service spiral. This
may be one reason why the GCA is biased toward the AWB. One might form the opinion that
the GCA is attempting to identify with the shareholders of AWB Limited in an effort to
represent them and thereby restore its relevance to producers.
It is worth noting that the GCA has not forged an alliance with other grower organisations to
increase its relevance within the grains industry.  The GCA does not recognise grower
organisations that have an interest in bulk handlers other than AWB. The grower organisations
that own shares in the bulk handlers are relatively lucrative and have money to invest in
industry research and policy development; hence an alliance would seen natural given the
GCA’s financial constraints.  United Grower Holdings owns Aus-Bulk and represents growers
in South Australia and Grain Growers Association owns 21.8 per cent of GrainCorp and
represents growers in QLD, NSW and Victoria. Growers in Western Australia have elected to
remain in a cooperative.  However the GCA also shuns the Pastoralist and Graziers Association
in that state, which has a public policy against the single desk.
Grain Growers Association was not established as a lobby organisation.  It was established in
1958 to provide collective grain grading services to its members.  Similarly Aus-Bulk was
established in 1954 to allow growers to ship bulk wheat rather than bag wheat and this
organisation also provides services to its members.  These two organizations have filled the
policy development void in the industry.  These organisations supported the Kronos Report and
the Accenture Report into the grains industry; however these two reports were rejected by the
GCA on the grounds that the reports were funded by self-interested participants.  The last
significant contribution to policy debate from the GCA was the Booz-Allen Consulting Group
Report (1994).
It is thus clear that there has been a separation of grower representation into either the AWB
camp or the camp of the other domestic bulk handlers.  It seems likely that AWB management
would not listen to Grain Growers Association or United Grower Holdings advice on policy
issues.  It also seems likely that the GCA would not represent the interests of Grain Growers
Association or United Growers Holdings.  Thus a new body needs to be established to account
for these alliances when assessing the value of political decisions that have an impact on not
only the bulk handlers but also all the other users of grain in the domestic industry.14
The New Structure
Before a new structure is proposed it is worthwhile to consider the limitations of the current
governance structure.  Currently the WEA reviews only the operations of AWB International
rather than the parent company AWB Limited. The WEA reports its findings to the Minister
for Agriculture and the Grain Council of Australia.  The Minister and the Grain Council appear
reluctant to implement the recommendations produced by WEA.  Hence a new body is
required to assess and implement the recommendations of the WEA.
It seems implausible that only a selection of growers through the GCA will have an interest in
the operations of AWB International. Growers in each state will also likely have an interest in
their state based bulk handler, which may now be affected by the operations of AWB
International managing the supply chain to port. It appears also that the GCA has aligned itself
with AWB Limited and squarely against the remainder of the domestic industry.
The operations of AWB International now affect its competitors in the domestic industry, the
private rail operators in each state, and the private port terminals.  There is also the interest of
the domestic milling and baking industry as well as the lot feeders and poultry industries, to
consider.  These groups have been very vocal in their opposition to the manner in which AWB
International has conducted its operations. Having said this it can also be expected that
competitors to AWB International would prefer to compete with AWB Limited on an equal
footing (Joint Industry Submission Group, 2000).
Due to the fact that AWB International conducts confidential trade deals it is prudent for an
independent organisation such as the WEA to undertake the analysis of the benefit to growers
and the costs associated with service delivery.  However once that process has been achieved a
new pathway would be required to implement the WEA recommendations.
Passing the recommendations through the Minister adds a political component plus a rather
slow legislative component that may not be in the interest of the industry.  The industry review
above has been testament to the speed of change.  The political component is that the Minister
appears to be politically sensitive to making changes that may in any form appear to affect the
single desk.  Since the single desk is too politically sensitive, an alternate management process
must be developed.
For the sake of decisions that are in the best interests of all growers the committee that reviews
the WEA reports should be a predetermined mixture of industry stakeholders.  The
stakeholders’ committee should also include a member from one of the competing bulk
handlers, a member from the domestic milling and baking industry, and a member from the lot
feeders or poultry industries plus a member from a railway company. The number of grower
representatives from AWB and GCA should be matched by a proportional number of
representatives from Grain Growers Association, United Grower Holdings and PGA.
The committee should have the power to vote on each of the WEA recommendations and
advise AWB International directly to act on the recommendations that should be implemented.
The committee should functional only as long as the single desk is in operation.15
In the long term growers will need to be represented as shareholders rather than as
beneficiaries of government distributions.  This will require grower organisations to reshape
their priorities and alter their lobbying strategies to negotiate with business managers rather
than politicians.
Progressive grower organisations will likely find that they are negotiating less with
government members and more with the management of agribusiness companies, rail
companies and port handling companies.  To represent their members’ interests effectively the
organisation will need to focus on their members as shareholders.  Shareholders will be the
only growers with the power to influence directors and provide adequate governance for the
industry.  The organisation will also have to make allowance for the fact that the shareholder
will have interests in several companies some of which may be in strong competition with one
another.  One might also expect that one of the organisations new roles will also be to liaise
with regulation authorities to respond on the costs and efficacy of service delivery to members.
Conclusion
In this paper it has been shown that the grains industry has been through a dynamic phase of
privatisation.  Growers are slowly coming to terms with the fact that they now own the assets
of their industry and that they are no longer dealing with government but with the boards of
agribusiness companies, rail companies and port companies.  The issue of AWB International’s
control over the supply chain needs to be rectified.  The bulk handler to port segment needs to
be open to more competition.  This will of course require AWB international to specify their
product more closely to avoid blending and grading problems.  A new committee is also
required to assess the WEA recommendations and to implement changes.  Under the current
system the process has been stifled by political sensitivity and the alignment of GCA with
AWB Limited.  The industry participants in the domestic market also require input into the
functions of the single desk and more attention needs to be devoted to their interests.  A new
style shareholder organisation will be necessary to represent the interests of growers into the
future.  The shareholder organisation will have to take into account the fact that their
shareholder members will have an interest in more than one grain handling company.16
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